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The dynamics of statehood in the practice of
international and English courts
alexander orakhelashvili
1 Introduction
To honour James Crawford on this special occasion, it is proposed to
examine statehood in its dynamic aspect, drawing on legal aspects of
recognition, State responsibility and State immunity that most promi-
nently feature among the multiple areas of law that he has mastered as a
distinguished scholar and practitioner.
From Althusius and Grotius onwards, the study of statehood has
focused upon the original derivation of sovereignty and the options to
share or alienate it.1 The doctrinal consolidation along with the positivist
approach was led by the nineteenth-century German classical school,
notably Paul Laband and Georg Jellinek, to identify the initial criteria of
what makes a State.2 These criteria – territory, population and govern-
ment (or public authority) – have eventually developed into the com-
monly accepted standard for State creation. These have been thoroughly
examined,3 there being no pressing need to revisit them.
The focus will instead be upon the continuous exercise of sovereign
authority once the above static criteria of statehood are both established
and undisputed in relation to the relevant entity. The dynamic aspect of
statehood relates to manifesting the State’s sovereign character through
regular acts of public authority that draw on the patterns of daily oper-
ation of the international legal system, and their opposability on the
international plane.
1 Cf. Hugo Krabbe, The Modern Idea of the State (New York and London: D. Appleton and
Company, 1922), 17–28.
2 Paul Laband, Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, 1st edn (Freiburg and Leipzig: Mohr, 1895),
164 et seq.; Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: O. Ha¨ring, 1914), 394 et seq.
3 James Crawford, Creation of States in International Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press,
2006), chs. 2–3.
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2 Introducing the dynamic aspect of statehood
The key conceptual issue is the unity and divisibility of statehood. The
commentary to the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Article 4 on
State responsibility specifies that ‘The principle of the unity of the State
entails that the acts or omissions of all its organs should be regarded as acts
or omissions of the State for the purposes of international responsibility.’4
However, in an early but extremely important contribution on State
immunity, Crawford has articulated the non-absolute nature of State
immunity as following from the divisibility of sovereign authority that
every State possesses.5
The divisibility or unity of States can be seen either in factual terms of
the structural arrangement of States, or in terms of the substantive scope
of their sovereign powers.Whether statehood is structurally indivisible, in
relation to which question the national law of the State will, according to
the principle stated in the ILC’s Article 4(2), be an initial starting point, is
not a question identical to whether the substantive scope of the sovereign
authority encompasses the totality of State activities. For, through any
of its structural components, the State can enter into the multitude of
dealings and transactions that do not require the exercise of sovereign
authority. If, along these lines, sovereignty is divisible, then international
law cannot invariably attach identical consequences to all acts performed
by the State in both sovereign and non-sovereign areas.
As Krabbe has explained this dilemma, either the State is a power
arrangement (Machterscheinung) that creates law and thus is not subject
to private law or, if it is indeed subjected to private law just like any
other private entity, then its essence cannot be explained by reference to
sovereign authority alone. The State exercises public authority differently
from the way it administers postal services or a railway network. Krabbe
proposed relying on the concept of legal sovereignty instead of that of State
sovereignty, which would thenmean that the legal standing of the State in
relation to citizens, including its ‘added value’ (Mehrwertigkeit) in the area
4 Report of the International LawCommission on theWork of its 53rd Session, ILCYearbook,
2 (2001), 40. Other possible examples of defining the State structure include Art. 2(1)(b)
UnitedNationsConvention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (New
York, adopted 2December 2004, not yet in force); theOil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran
v. United States of America), Judgment, 6 November 2003, ICJ Reports (2003), 191, and
Art. 3(e) in UNGA Resolution 3314 (1974) defining aggression, respectively associating
with the State structure ships and armed forces lawfully stationed abroad.
5 James Crawford, ‘International Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune
Transactions’, British Yearbook of International Law, 54 (1983), 75.
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of public authority proper, wouldmaterialise only through the framework
of law.6 If Krabbe’s equation could be exported to the international legal
realm when particular acts and transactions of States fall to be assessed
for their public and sovereign character, then the sovereign authority of
the State would validly exist to the extent that international law recognises
it as such.
In any case, the scope and essence of public, sovereign or governmental
authority of the State must be seen in prescriptive, not factual, terms,
for authority as such is a prescriptive construct, not a fact; it is created
andmaintained through prescriptive ordering. Whether seen through Sir
Henry Maine’s articulation of legal fictions,7 or through Hans Kelsen’s
imputation theory,8 governmental authority is not what the organ in
question is doing factually, but the scope of functions that the legal system
bestows upon that organ in its particular capacity as an organ of the
State.
Some clues as to the substance of the prescriptive standard are pro-
vided in the ILC’s commentary to Article 5 on State responsibility. This
suggests that the ‘governmental authority’ of the State does not cover sit-
uations where domestic law confers powers upon, or authorises conduct
by, citizens or residents generally, or as part of the general regulation of
the affairs of the community, but only where it specifically authorises
the conduct as involving the exercise of public authority. ‘Governmental
authority’ does not attach to private activities. As for the specific content
of this standard, the ILC has observed that ‘Beyond a certain limit, what is
regarded as “governmental” depends on the particular society, its history
and traditions.’9
The ILC’s is a nuanced statement, which effectively suggests that there
may be a complementary international standard with respect to the
valid and internationally opposable exercise of governmental authority. A
shared international understanding of public, sovereign and governmen-
tal authority would, in the first place at least, be premised on the inherent
nature of States that all States share and aspire to maintain. As Hans
Kelsen has observed, the State is similar to the individual in its aspiration
6 Hugo Krabbe, Die Lehre der Rechtssouvera¨nita¨t – Beitrag zur Staatslehre (Groningen: J. B.
Wolters, 1906), 29–31, 38.
7 Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law (London: J. Murray, 1920), 31.
8 HansKelsen,General Theory of Lawand State, tr. AndersWedberg (NewYork: The Lawbook
Exchange, 1945), 196 et seq.
9 Report of the International LawCommission on theWork of its 53rd Session, 43 (emphasis
added).
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to achieve its aims, to develop and prosper.10 Philip Jessup has similarly
observed that States, too, have ‘feelings’.11
But these factors are not among the immediate concerns of interna-
tional law.Whether we take a dualist position that States are at the roots of
the international legal system, or subscribe to Kelsen’s monist approach
that statehood is the characterisation imputed by international law to the
entities that qualify, it obtains in either case that international law does
not initially create States as socio-political realities. It merely attaches
certain consequences to the fact of their existence. The State initially
gets organised on a basis unrelated to international law; the latter has
hardly any say as to the reasons and factors – historical, socio-economic,
trade-related, cultural and so on – that motivate the organisation of an
entity as a State,12 still less does it pronounce on the ultimate justification
of statehood. The formation, transformation and related development
of States constitute a complex socio-political process displayed through
the specificity of individual situations that do not lend themselves to a
crude generalisation. International law can, then, only take cognisance of
the essence of statehood as is inherent to it across the board; it cannot
construct the substantive rationale of statehood afresh.
In a way that applies to all States, Ludwig Gumplowicz has described
the State as the organisation of power and domination through the legal
order.13 Similarly, if we follow Max Weber’s approach, statehood relates
to the organised use of coercion, legitimating and monopolising the use
of force within the relevant territorial boundaries, and the correspond-
ing obedience from men and women. The justification of domination –
and depending also on its extent – can be explained through religious
considerations, habitual traditional obedience, charisma and grace or
alternatively through legality that consists in the validity of the legal rules
that the State enacts by virtue of its functionally delimited authority. In
10 HansKelsen,Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre Entwickelt aus der Lehre vomRechtssatze,
2nd edn (Tu¨bingen: Mohr, 1923), 496.
11 Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948),
28.
12 The reasons are diverse, and often contested or obscured. For instance, in a somewhat
unlikely manner, one reason that led to the unification of North American colonies into
the United States of America was the need to raise the Navy adequate to deal with the
Barbary piracy threat from North Africa, Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith and Fantasy:
America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
2007). See more generally, Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From
Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (London: Profile Books, 2011).
13 Ludwig Gumplowicz, Allgemeines Staatsrecht (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1907), 24.
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all those cases obedience could in practice be determined by what Weber
denotes as ‘highly robust motives of fear and hope – fear of the vengeance
of magical powers or of the power-holder’.14
What Weber thus focuses upon is how the power-holder sells the justi-
fication and how that justification comes across to people. The two may
not always overlap in practice, and the visions of legitimation may thus
diverge at the opposing ends of the equation. Nor does that actual pro-
cess of legitimation always have to be concomitant with the ‘terms and
conditions’ officially stated in the relevant State’s constitution, but could
also embrace more informal but widely perceived grounds.
Out of the approximately 200 States to which international law applies,
not all operate in the sameway. Some States are premised on amore or less
straightforward constitutional pattern of representation and accountabil-
ity, the use of coercion being limited to carefully demarcated instances
of violating legal prescriptions, beyond which individuals retain com-
plete freedom of choice as to their activities in various areas of social
life without fearing coercion, oppression or reprisal. Other States, how-
ever, are dominated by more unspoken premises that often divide rather
than unite communities and, in order to survive, carry on and command
submission, either in terms of domestic governance or of occupation
and colonisation of foreign territories. The political systems in question
need to rely on fear and violence. For instance, the concept of public and
sovereign authority underlying Denmark or the Netherlands shows no
viable similarity with that on which the current political regime in Zim-
babwe or the Turkish domination of Northern Cyprus (created through
massive eviction of inhabitant and importing settlers) are premised. The
latter will, quite simply, not survive without oppression and continuing
efforts to consolidate the fruits of those oppressive efforts factually, and
validate them both domestically and internationally.
If, as observed above, international law does not specify the nature
of States and their political regimes in any a priori or comprehensive
manner, nor should it be the task of courts to draw themselves into those
complex processes. It was in this spirit that Lord Wilberforce warned
against ‘involv[ing] English courts in difficult and delicate questions as
to the motivation of a foreign State, and as to the concept of public good,
which would be unlikely to correspond with ours’.15 Nor has a top-down
attempt at excluding, totally or partially, States from the international legal
14 H. H. Gerth and G. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London:
Routledge, 1948), 78–9.
15 Czarnikow Ltd v. Rolimpex [1979] AC 351, 364.
Trim: 228mm× 152mm Top: 11.95mm Gutter: 18.98mm
CUUK2748-10 CUUK2748/Chinkin ISBN: 978 1 107 04425 8 September 25, 2014 19:39
the dynamics of statehood 177
system proposed, for instance, by liberal theory,16 succeeded in its aims
any more than radical monism succeeded in ensuring the supremacy of
international law.The task of international law andof the courts that apply
it seems to be more modest, namely to evaluate the nature of particular
State activities when it comes to the application of international law to
facts.
3 Applying the dynamic aspect of statehood
(a) The law of recognition – addressing the Namibia exception
In its AdvisoryOpinion onNamibia the International Court of Justice had
to examine the legal consequences of the illegal presence of South Africa
in Namibia. The Court pronounced the duty of third States not to accord
recognition to official acts of SouthAfrica inNamibia, so that its sovereign
powers there would not be given effect. That, however, did not extend to
acts such as ‘the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects
of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the
Territory’.17 The Court thus effectively proposed a two-pronged guideline
for applying this test: whether the recognition of the relevant act serves
the interests of the inhabitants; and whether such recognition permits the
illegal occupier to assert such public authority as the occupation purports
to generate.
The litigation before English courts in the case of Hesperides18 dealing
with property deprivation by the illegal authorities of the Turkish Repub-
lic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) addressed the whole matter through the
prism of private international law and applied, in relation to title to prop-
erty, the law of the place where the property was situated. The Court of
Appeal did not address the public international law issue of the legality of
the TRNC’s status, which was antecedent to those private law questions.
The Namibia two-pronged guidance was not addressed either. Instead,
Lord Denning was content to observe that the Northern Turkish admin-
istration was factually effective and that was enough for its laws – the
inherently public acts validating the initial invasion and separation – to
be recognised internationally.
16 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, European
Journal of International Law, 6 (1995), 504.
17 Legal Consequences of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 21 June 1971,
ICJ Reports (1971), 16, 56, para. 125.
18 Hesperides Hotels v. Aegean Holidays [1978] QB 205, 221 (per Lord Denning).
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The European Court of Justice took a more properly strict position in
Anastasiou, by denying the TRNC the power to issue export certificates
for exporting goods to the EU market, which was essentially a public
power available, in relation to the territory of the whole of Cyprus, only
to the government based in Nicosia.19 Strasbourg jurisprudence has also
addressed the matter, but what was at stake there was not the legality
of the TRNC’s public law authority that it had effectively stolen from
the Republic of Cyprus, but merely the remedies available to individuals
within the TRNCbefore they could take their cases to the EuropeanCourt
of Human Rights. Cyprus v. Turkey addressed this one single aspect head
on.20 This narrow focus of adjudication, coupled with the Court’s stated
policy to admit theNamibia exception only to the extent necessary not to
strip inhabitants of their basic rights,21 is a possible countervailing factor
that could constrain this exception within its proper limits. That much is
also obvious from the subsequent case of Demopoulos.22
The difference between public authority and private law is what is at
stake in this area, for it is essentially a legislative exercise beyond the gift
of international tribunals, to expand the Namibia exception from private
law to public law relationships, and correspondingly to trim down the
scope of the duty of non-recognition that is reflected in Article 41 of
the Articles on State Responsibility (ASR), or actually render that duty
nugatory.
That the Namibia exception does not extend to public acts was also
confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Kibris Turk Hava Yollari v. Secretary
of State for Transport. As Richards LJ most pertinently observed:
It is almost certainly true that the opening up of international flights
to northern Cyprus would be of great practical significance for persons
resident in the territory . . . But that does not bring the case within the
[Namibia] exception. Themere fact that the impugned public law decision
has a knock-on effect onprivate lives cannot be sufficient for the purpose.23
The standard upheld by the European Court of Human Rights is thus dif-
ferent from that under Hesperides and that which was advanced, but
19 R v.Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p. S. P. Anastasiou, Case C-432/92, 100
ILR 258, 296.
20 Cyprus v. Turkey, Application No. 25871/94, ECtHR, Judgment, 10 May 2001.
21 Ibid., para. 96.
22 Demopoulos and others v. Turkey, Application No. 46113/99, ECtHR, Admissibility Deci-
sion, 1 March 2010, para. 96.
23 Kibris Turk Hava Yollari v. Secretary of State for Transport [2010] EWCA Civ 1093,
12 October 2010, para. 80.
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rejected, in Anastasiou and subsequently by the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales in Kibris. This latter position, most prominently
represented by Hespreides, tries to modify the initial legal position by
reference to, and effectively in support of, the factual realities on the
ground, most profoundly including the illegal occupation. As every State
displays in time and space, recognising sovereign prerogatives in illegal
entities essentially amounts to stealing the same prerogatives from the
rightful owner – the State, or prospectively the non-State entity seeking
to become a State – that has the rightful title to the relevant territory. The
very purpose of the valid version of theNamibia exception is to safeguard
the scope of sovereign authority that the rightful owner legally retains.
(b) The law of State responsibility
As it happens, the approach of the law of State responsibility to State
activities is, in the first place at least, highly factual, referring to the factual
connection between the act of the State and breach of an international
obligation, without at that stage introducing any further requirement as
to the sovereign or other nature underlying the relevant act. Attribution
requirements under Article 4 ASR follow from the already established
premise that the organ in question acts as a State organ. However, in
relation to non-State entities, whose status as an organ of the State is not
obvious, the nature of the activity assumes predominant importance in
ascertaining whether their conduct entails the responsibility of the State
for which they act.
Whether we are dealing with contexts involving States with different
socio-economic systems, or the increasing pattern of privatisation and
outsourcing of multiple State activities, whether through the prisons sys-
tem or the use of private military companies, the issue as to the extent to
which the State can alienate its sovereign functions and therefore evade
responsibility becomes pressing. For outsourcing of public functions to
non-State entities whose identity is separate from that of the State, impor-
tantly raises the question as to the precise (non-)sovereign nature of the
relevant activities, ultimately to answer the question whether the relevant
State should still be held responsible for what has, strictly speaking, been
done by someone else. A positive answer to this question is possible only
if the non-State entity in question has been given the powers to act in lieu
of the State – that is, to do whatever would not be doable but for being a
State.
Commentary to the ILC’sArticle 5 suggests that to attract responsibility,
‘the conduct of an entitymust accordingly concerngovernmental activity’;
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and the person or entity [must be] acting in that capacity in the particular
instance’.24 The criterion seems to be whether the relevant entity has
been doing that for which the State would have to use its sovereign
capacity were it to perform the same act itself. An inevitable conclusion,
however contextual, is that even if the law of State responsibility does not
associate the responsibility of the State as such (under Article 4) with the
governmental, public or sovereign nature of its activities, it still provides
for the test to identify the scope of such activities.
Other,more specialised, areas of responsibility follow suit. The require-
ment of ‘official capacity’ under Article 1 of the 1984 UN Convention
Against Torture (CAT),25 to regulate the responsibility of non-State enti-
ties for torture26 is quite similar in essence to ‘governmental authority’
the way Article 5 ASR addresses it. In this particular case, it is about non-
State entities (rebels, insurgents and other de facto arrangements) that,
although not being a State nor having been delegated official functions
from any State, have come to exercise the relevant public functions that
would, were other things equal, be exercised in that dimension of time
and space by one or another State.
The involvement of private military companies (PMC) in various con-
flicts has given rise to a debate as to how attribution and ‘governmental
authority’ works in relation to them.27 The factual context, including
at its most extreme a PMC being drawn into combat situations, may
not, as such, be crucial. It depends upon the purpose for which force is
being used and the nature of that force. The example of food supply or
premises security is invoked,28 arguably to emphasise that PMCs should
enjoy security in performing their tasks. It is not the PMCs’ but rather
the State’s public authority, of which a PMC is merely a dedicated ser-
vant, that holds the key in determining responsibility. Even the use of
force in self-defence, provided that its proper limits under the relevant
domestic law are observed, may not be that different from a similar action
undertaken by a private individual on the streets of an average town in
24 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session, 43.
25 Art. 2 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (New York, adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force
26 June 1987), 1465 UNTS 85.
26 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur, The United Nation Convention Against Torture:
A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2008), 78–9.
27 Chia Lenhardt, ‘Private Military Companies and State Responsibility’ in Simon Chester-
man and Chia Lenhardt (eds.), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of
Private Military Companies (Oxford University Press, 2007), 139.
28 Ibid., 148.
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Texas. What matters is whether the State has tasked the company to
perform the activities that only States can perform as part of their public
authority, either as ordinary State functions in peacetime, or those related
to war and foreseen under humanitarian law treaties, such as the interro-
gation of prisoners or maintaining law and order in occupied territories;
and then also whether the PMC’s particular conduct is performed at the
service of that public authority.
The Arbitral Award in United Postal Service of America Inc. (UPS) v.
Canada provides a rare example of judicial articulation of the ‘govern-
mental authority’ test.29 Canada Post – operating as part of the Canadian
Statemachinery – prevented theUnited Postal Services fromhaving access
to the Canadian postal market the way it had enabled other operators,
arguably breaching Canada’s obligations under sections 1102 and 1105
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).30 The tribunal
had to assess whether the acts of Canada Post were attributable to Canada
directly and, if not, whether Canada could be held responsible pursuant to
Articles 1502(3)(a) and 1503(2) NAFTA, which requires parties to ensure
that government-owned or designated monopolies, or State enterprises
exercising certaindelegated authority, complywithChapter 11of the same
Agreement.31 The relevant NAFTA provisions, ‘read as a whole [led] the
Tribunal to the conclusion that the general residual law reflected in Article
4 of the ILC text’ was replaced by ‘the special rules of law stated in chapters
11 and 15’.
The particular provisions of chapter 15 themselves distinguish in their
operation between the Party on the one side and the monopoly or enter-
prise on the other. It is the Party which is to ensure that the monopolies
or enterprises meet the Party’s obligations stated in the prescribed cir-
cumstances. The obligations remain those of the State Party; they are not
placed on the monopoly or enterprise.
Thus, the Canadian State and Canada Post each possessed separate
identities; the latter’s acts would not per se become the former’s for the
purposes of NAFTA, even if they could be attributable to Canada under
the general law of responsibility.32 The principle of the ‘unity of the State’
was effectively derogated from.
29 United Postal Service of America, Inc. v. Canada, ICSID Arbitration, Award on the Merits
(24 May 2007).
30 North American Free Trade Agreement, Canada–Mexico–United States (adopted
17 December 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994), 32 ILM (1992), 605.
31 United Postal Service of America, Inc. v. Canada, paras. 45–6.
32 Ibid., paras. 55, 59, 62.
Trim: 228mm× 152mm Top: 11.95mm Gutter: 18.98mm
CUUK2748-10 CUUK2748/Chinkin ISBN: 978 1 107 04425 8 September 25, 2014 19:39
182 alexander orakhelashvili
All then turned on whether Canada Post exercised ‘governmental
authority’. Sections 1502 and 1503 were contingent on ‘establish[ing] that
the monopoly or State enterprise in question is exercising a “regulatory,
administrative or other governmental authority that the Party has dele-
gated to it”’, so that ‘a State Party does not avoid its own obligations under
the Agreement as a whole . . . by delegating governmental authority to a
monopoly (private or public) or to a State enterprise’. Thus, not all acts
inconsistentwithNAFTAwere caught; the two ‘provisions operate[d] only
where the monopoly or enterprise exercises the defined authority and not
where it exercises other rights or powers. They have a restricted operation’.
The tribunal observed that ‘[t]o be contrasted with the exercise of that
[governmental] authority is the use by a monopoly or State enterprise of
those rights and powers which it shares with other businesses competing
in the relevant market and undertaking commercial activities’. Therefore,
in relation to access to market and use of infrastructure, Canada Post was
not acting on terms foreseen under the ILC’s Article 5.33 Liability would
materialise if Canada Post would act not just in contradiction to Canada’s
NAFTA obligations, but additionally do so in the exercise of governmental
powers that the Canadian government would have delegated to it.
The tribunal’s observation as to the general scope of public authority
is also instructive:
In terms of the instances listed in [sections 1502 and 1503] the body exer-
cising this authority expropriates the property, grants the license, approves
the commercial transaction (such as a merger), or imposes the quota, fee
or charge – in all cases by the unilateral exercise of the governmental
authority delegated to it. While that list of authorities is not exhaustive, it
helps to identify a genus which involves binding decision-making. So too
does the word ‘authority’ when read with its three adjectives – ‘regulatory,
administrative or governmental’.
The tribunal’s open-ended approach is further instructive in the sense that
responsibility does not depend on whether outsourced activities involve
the exercise of coercive powers.34
(c) The Law of State Immunity
Addressing the area of sovereign immunity requires focusing on the
restrictive immunity doctrine, which centres on distinguishing sovereign
33 Ibid., paras. 68, 70, 72–4, 78. 34 Ibid., para. 79 (emphasis original).
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from non-sovereign acts. What matters is the nature of State acts rather
than their perpetration by organs of a sovereign State.
As an instance illustrating underlying distinctions, socialist States ordi-
narily used to claim absolute immunity, for the restrictive doctrine did
not admit immunity ‘in those cases in which a state performs acts that are
also open to private persons’. Socialist States entered ‘into a whole series
of such contracts on the ground of its state monopoly of foreign trade’,
and it was thus ‘impossible to split up the socialist State into two subjects:
a sovereign power and an entity subject to private law rules’.35 Even after
the demise of the Socialist Camp, this problem retains its relevance, for
both directions of interaction between the State and private activity – the
State entering the privatemarketplace and the State outsourcing its public
functions – remain part of modern socio-economic life.
Although the restrictive doctrine is deemed to have been introduced
into international law since the mid-twentieth century, its roots can be
found in the pronouncements by Sir Robert Phillimore in The Charkieh,
to the effect that:
No principle of international law, and no decided case, and no dictum of
jurists of which I am aware, has gone so far as to authorize a sovereign to
assume the character of a trader, when it is for his benefit; and when he
incurs an obligation to a private subject to throw off, if I may so speak,
his disguise, and appear as a sovereign, claiming for his own benefit, and
to the injury of a private person, for the first time, all the attributes of his
character.36
This reasoning addresses how and in what manner the sovereign enters
themarketplace, ormore generally into private relations, that are available
to any private actor. In whichever quality or capacity they enter it, so they
are supposed to carry on. If the State as a public entity ventures into
private dealings the way that everyone else can act, that demonstrates
that it can be subjected to the ordinary law applicable to individuals.
This approach was further crystallised in the Congreso case where Lord
Wilberforce clearly emphasised that if an act can be performed by private
persons it is no longer sovereign act.37 The purpose of immunities under
the restrictive doctrine is to protect privileges inherently deriving from
statehood, not the totality of State activities.
35 M. M. Boguslavsky, ‘Foreign State Immunity: Soviet Doctrine and Practice’, Netherlands
Yearbook of International Law, 10 (1979), 169–70.
36 The Charkieh (1872–5) 4 LR 59, 99–100.
37 I Congreso del Partido [1983] 1 AC 244, 268.
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It is on this narrower version that immunity shields acts contradict-
ing international law. When the act in question is a valid exercise of
sovereign authority in the first place, the immunity for it will not fall
away merely for the reason that the same act violates international law;
not that the unlawful could attract immunity without its sovereign nature
being demonstrated in an antecedent manner.
The ways of identifying the connection between the relevant act and
the scope of sovereign powers have been articulated in jurisprudence.
In the practice of American courts, this has been done in relation to the
ownership and control by the State of its natural resources. It was observed
in the Pemex case that:
The Court must regard carefully a sovereign’s conduct with respect to
its natural wealth. A very basic attribute of sovereignty is the control
over its mineral resources and short of actually selling these resources on
the world market, decisions and conduct concerning them are uniquely
governmental in nature.38
In the case of InternationalAssociation ofMachinists andAerospaceWorkers
v. OPEC, another US court has similarly observed that:
The control over a nation’s natural resources stems from the nature of
sovereignty. By necessity and by traditional recognition, each nation is its
own master in respect to its physical attributes. The defendants’ control
over their oil resources is an especially sovereign function because oil, as
their primary, if not sole, revenue-producing resource, is crucial to the
welfare of their nations’ peoples.39
The sovereign nature thus accrued only to that narrow area of sovereign
activity and decision-making process. This narrow area of control – initial
and ultimate decision-making if not the day-to-day administration – is a
cardinally important aspect of sovereignty; not least because it essentially
follows from the permanent sovereignty over natural resources in line
with Resolution 1803(1962) adopted by the UNGeneral Assembly. There
can be no serious doubt about this falling within sovereign authority
before many other activities will be so labelled.
38 Pemex Corporacio´n Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L de C.V v. Pemex-
Exploracio´n y Produccio´n, No. 10 Civ. 206 (AKH), 2013 WL 4517225 (SDNY Aug 27,
2013).
39 For the overview of both cases and other relevant jurisprudence see G. R. Delaume,
‘Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity’, American Journal of International
Law, 79 (1985), 325, 327.
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The same principle was upheld by the European Court of Human
Rights in a different context, distinguishing between the organisational
policy underlying the arrangement of a foreign embassy that falls within
the area of sovereignty andmay attract sovereign immunity, and themore
specific issue of the embassy’s compliance with an employee’s contractual
rights, which may not.40
The restrictive immunity doctrine does not always overlapwith theway
national immunity legislation, for instance the 1978 UK State Immunity
Act (SIA), regulates the relevant matters. As Lord Diplock emphasised
in the Alcom case, the SIA does not codify the restrictive doctrine that
requires examining the precise (non-)sovereign nature of the relevant
act, but grants foreign States absolute immunity unless the matter falls
within the specific exceptions set out under the same Act.41 However,
States are not bound by these statutory standards internationally. Court
decisions based on the letter of domestic statutes are premised on the
exclusion of international law from judicial consideration. They are thus
not constitutive of State practice that could possibly build customary
law on immunities.42 States can amend their legislation the way that the
United States and Canada have done in relation to terrorist activities,43
effectively manifesting their position that there is no such indivisible
concept of sovereignty which requires that States should be able to claim
their sovereign privileges in relation to terrorist activities.
One areawhere restrictive doctrine and the ensuing sovereign authority
test can be used even within domestic statutory frameworks relates to
‘separate entities’ under section 14(2) of the SIA, which prescribes that
the entity affiliated with the governmental apparatus of the foreign State
is immune only if ‘the proceedings relate to anything done by it in the
exercise of sovereign authority’. This was confirmed in Kuwait Air Co.,
where Lord Goff emphasised that ‘it is not enough that the entity should
have acted on the directions of the State, because such an act need not
40 Fogarty v. UK, Application No. 37112/97, ECtHR, Judgment, 21 November 2001, paras.
22, 30, 38.
41 Alcom v. Republic of Colombia [1984] AC 580, 600.
42 F. A. Mann, ‘The State Immunity Act 1978’, British Yearbook of International Law, 51
(1980), 43; James Crawford, ‘A Foreign State Immunities Act for Australia?’, Australian
Yearbook of International Law, 8 (1983), 105–6.
43 See, for an overview, Ronald Bettauer, ‘Germany Sues Italy at the International Court
of Justice on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Legal Underpinnings and Implications for
US Law’, ASIL Insight, 19 November 2009; and the amendments to the Canadian State
Immunity Act (RSC 1985, c. S-18), 13 March 2012.
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possess the character of a governmental act. To attract immunity under
section 14(2), therefore, what is done by the separate entity must be
something which possesses that character.’44 Thus, section 14(2) requires
the Court first to identify the character of the organ and then to apply the
restrictive doctrine to its action.
The issue was addressed before the SIA came into force, in the Trendtex
case where Shaw LJ and Stephenson LJ refused to consider the Central
Bank of Nigeria as an organ of the Nigerian State, for the relevant leg-
islative amendments that drew on the Bank’s status fell short of revealing
legislative intention to that effect.45 A similar philosophy underlies the
pronouncements in Rolimpex that the entity in question was not part of
the Polish State since, even if it ‘bought and sold for the State’, it retained
a considerable freedom in relation to day-to-day commercial activities.46
To some extent, then, the very status of a ‘separate legal entity’ as Trendtex
had it, will depend on the nature of its tasks and the degree of its affiliation
with the sovereign functions of the State. In Rolimpex the entity in ques-
tionwas confirmed in that status, enabling it to claima substantive defence
against non-compliance with contractual obligations due to government
intervention beyond its control – an issue unrelated to immunities. But
the underlying test of State public authority remained the same in both
areas of law; in both cases the core issue was, and was answered in the
negative, whether the entity in question was acting as part of the State
and exercising its sovereign functions. Capitalising on previous jurispru-
dence, Lord Goff concluded in Kuwait Air Co. that ‘in the absence of such
[governmental] character, the mere fact that the purpose or motive of the
act was to serve the purposes of the state will not be sufficient to enable
the separate entity to claim immunity under section 14(2) of the Act’.47
As for the governing law on this issue, it was emphasised in Trendtex
that:
the constitution and powers of a Nigerian corporation must be viewed in
the light of the domestic law of Nigeria. But its status in the international
scene falls to be decided by the law of the country in which an issue as
to its status is raised. In civilised states that law will derive from those
principles of international law which have been generally accepted among
such states.48
44 Kuwait Air Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company and others [1995] 1 WLR 1147, 1160
(per Lord Goff).
45 Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 QB 529, 565, 573.
46 Czarnikow Ltd v. Rolimpex, 364 (per Lord Wilberforce), 367 (per Viscount Dilhorne).
47 Kuwait Air Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company and others, 1160.
48 Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 575 (per Shaw LJ).
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It is therefore affirmed that the domestic forummust, whenever possible,
select international law as the law determining the (non-)sovereign status
of the entity. As Shaw LJ observed, even if the Bank was a sub-serving
agent for government departments, that was not sufficient to make it part
of the government.49 Domestic law provided the initial point of reference,
while international law assessed the nature of the relevant domestic legal
arrangements, and ultimately determined where sovereign authority lies.
Similar choice-of-law issues are confronted in cases where States them-
selves, or their officials, claim immunity. The use of the restrictive doctrine
under international law in the criminal case of Pinochet crucially deter-
mined the scope of sovereign functions and that they do not include inter-
national crimes.50 It may be tempting to conclude that, after the thread
of jurisprudence culminating with the International Court’s judgment in
Germany v. Italy, civil cases are different.51 Care should be taken, however,
not to take this jurisprudence in a casuistic manner, for the nature of judi-
cial reasoning must always be put above judicial statistics. If we use this
approach, it will be easily discovered that all pertinent cases confirming
immunity in civil proceedings fail to focus on the requirements under the
restrictive doctrine. The Strasbourg decision in Al-Adsani did not utter
a single word regarding the (non-)sovereign nature of torture, the way
the restrictive doctrine as detailed above would require it to do.52 The
House of Lords in Jones did not focus on the restrictive doctrine either,
instead asserting that once the relevant acts were attributable to Saudi
Arabia under the law of State responsibility these acts attracted immunity
as well.53 In other words the House of Lords concluded that attributing
an act to the State will invariably lead to according it immunity. The
Germany v. Italy judgment did not examine the restrictive doctrine in
any detail, and instead relied on the Italian concession that German war
crimes were sovereign acts. When focusing on the acts of armed forces,
49 Ibid., 575.
50 Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex p. Pinochet Ugarte
(No. 3) [2000] 1 AC 147.
51 Cf. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment,
3 February 2012, General List No. 143, para. 87.
52 Al-Adsani v. UK, Application No. 35763/97, ECtHR, Judgment, 21 November 2001, 34
EHRR 11 (2002). Twelve years later, in Jones v UK, the Fourth Chamber of the European
Court has not provided any more substantiated explanation of the rationale and basis of
State immunity than its derivation from the sovereignty of States either (Jones and others
v. UK, Applications Nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06, ECtHR, Judgment, 14 January 2014,
not reported yet).
53 Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 16, 14 June 2006, paras. 11–2 (per Lord Bingham), 76
(per Lord Hoffmann).
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the International Court focused on the identity of the perpetrator, not
the nature of acts, and essentially accorded immunity to Germany on the
basis of the – now outdated – absolute immunity doctrine.54
Thus, all the three above cases – Al-Adsani, Jones and Germany v.
Italy – fall short of being good law, for they allowed the relevant States to
claim immunity for what are not acts of their sovereignty. It is further-
more odd, to say the least, to contend that the relevant crime could be a
sovereign act for civil but not for criminal proceedings. It is a misconcep-
tion that the denial of immunity for serious violations of human rights
andhumanitarian lawcontradicts the State-centric natureof international
law. Protecting the internationally recognised valid scope of statehood and
public authority is just as much – and as little – as the State-centric nature
of international law actually requires.
4 The three areas evaluated
The dynamic aspect of statehood addresses the extent to which a State
can validly use its sovereign authority or rely on it to evade responsibil-
ity. Obviously the test of governmental or sovereign authority is bound
to be the same for all pertinent areas of international law, focusing on
the authority available only to States, not acts or rights that can also be
performed by private or other non-State entities. A State cannot be more
or less sovereign in different areas or contexts. To operate viably and
predictably, the three above areas of international law rely on that single
overarching concept of public authority for their own purposes and focus
upon the aspects of it to be applied to each of those areas, thereby rein-
forcing the unity of that test andmutual interconnectedness of its various
elements.
The law of recognition and State responsibility law are concerned only
with situations when the entity other than the State acts in a legitimate
or purported exercise of State authority. The law of immunities aims not
just to prove facts of State involvement but to classify them for the further
additional purpose, and to delimit the extent towhich the ordinary course
of justice can be evaded. In the end, the historical process of elaboration
upon all these standards has served the common and overriding goal to
secure efficient accountability.
54 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), paras. 60
et seq.
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Furthermore, the notion of ‘separate entity’ operates to enable the State
to get away from foreign proceedings when the relevant act is jure imperii.
Thus, in the law of immunities, ‘governmental authority’ assumes the
same dimension as in the law of State responsibility as per UPS, the way
that it includes – and in this case immunises – actions performed within
the valid scope of sovereign authority as recognised under international
law, and excludes other actions.55 The application of section 14 SIA in
Kuwait Air Co. broadly fits within this approach.
Thus, if a State delegates public authority to a ‘separate entity’ for
whatever purpose, that State is responsible for everything factually done
in the exercise of that delegated or outsourced authority; even though,
depending on its substance, the actual specific act performed within the
area covered by Article 5 ASR, that is under the guise of ‘governmental
authority’, may or may not be a genuine exercise of that authority. The
ILC commentary does not require that it should be. Nor does it have
to be, for the use of the ‘governmental authority’ test in Article 5 is
merely to channel the factually occurred incidences back to the State so
that the latter’s liability materialises. Again, Article 5 is not about the
governmental or official nature of specific acts, it is about the a priori
generalised conferral, by the State to a non-State entity, of the authority
to perform activities in that particular area.
If the ‘governmental authority’ test is used in terms of defining the
nature of a particular wrongful act, it could be used homogenously for the
purposes of both State responsibility and State immunity. For Article 5
purposes, the delegating State does not, at the point of delegation or
conferral, determine unilaterally what ‘governmental authority’ covers; it
merely ends up transferring to the non-State entity the powers that under
international law and independently of State will expressed at the point of
delegation, already possess such governmental character. The underlying
formula is not ‘I determine if X is governmental and then delegate it’, but
‘I delegate what already is governmental.’
The outcome specifically for the purposes of immunities is that the
State can claim immunity for acts of a ‘separate entity’ only if those acts
were validly performed as part of that delegated ‘governmental author-
ity’, with the effect that the outsourcing State itself would, as a matter
55 After all, the articulation of this test in United Postal Service of America, Inc. v. Canada,
para. 79 is fairly similar to the criteria of jure imperii acts in Contemporary Problems
Concerning the Immunity of States, Institute of International Law, Basel Session, 1991, Art.
2(3) (Special Rapporteur Ian Brownlie).
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of international law, be validly entitled to claim immunity for those acts
under the restrictive doctrine of immunity. For, the restrictive doctrine
addresses not just general systemic and constitutional patterns of delega-
tion and outsourcing, but also crucially focuses on the governmental or
private nature of that very specific act in relation to which immunity is
being claimed.
The relevant activities can initially be described as governmental or
private: compare an arrest with the sale of tickets. What also matters,
however, is whether individual acts are undertaken within the area that
broadly involves governmental authority, whether by the State or dele-
gated to a non-State entity. We can thus contrast a general context of
policing or maintenance of discipline in prisons to the supply of food or
torture of inmates, which are specific acts undertaken within the broader
task of governmental authority to run prisons. If the government out-
sources to a private entity the broader governmental authority to run the
prison, particular acts performed within this framework will be chan-
nelled back to the State through the principle stated in Article 5 ASR. For
the private entity would not commit these acts if governmental authority
had not been delegated to it from the State. Once attribution to the State is
determined, however, its responsibility will attach to individual acts, not
to that overall framework of governmental authority. Correspondingly,
for the purposes of the law of immunities, it is these specific acts that fall
to be assessed for their sovereign or private character. Thus, for instance,
acts perpetrated by a PMC and channelled to the State through Article 5
ASR would not, under the restrictive doctrine, attract immunity.
A PMC interrogating prisoners and torturing them enters the field
through the use of conferred public authority, but the act in question does
not become sovereign for the purposes of State immunity. For immunities
focus on specific acts, not general authority; the latter does not cover, nor
would be intended at the point of conferral to authorise, those specific
acts. Similarly, the State torturing in peacetime enters the field through
the private activity in the first place and is thus not immune. The State
would not thus be immune for the PMC’s torture either.
5 Conclusion
The advantage of focusing on the dynamic aspects of statehood, as
developed in judicial practice and the ILC’s work, is to promote effec-
tive accountability of States in various contexts, on inclusive terms and
through the application of the existing law. The areas examined above
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demonstrate that in the twenty-first century there could hardly be room
for the absolute and indivisible version of statehood. The reasoning that
preaches pragmatism, and alludes to imaginary needs of stability that
could be threatened by human rights litigation, in effect tries to super-
impose a preconceived ideology over the merit of legal evidence, and is
essentially a reasoning developed from the position of intellectual and
evidentiary weakness.
The comparative advantage, and thus power, of judicial reasoning is
that it holds the grip on the continuous process of the application of estab-
lished rules and principles of international law. Instead of projecting some
liberal transnational compact and on that basis discriminating between
States, the focus on the role of courts is premised on the inclusive approach
that applies to all States, great or small, liberal or ‘rogue’, integrating them
all within the same process of lawmaking and law-enforcement. It is not
completely free of inconsistencies, but the difference it has already made
is undeniable. Following this route is far more feasible than unrealisti-
cally waiting for some great systemic changes leading to a constitutional
revolution – especially if it is a revolution that most of us do not want to
happen.
